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Research articlePublished 26 Dec 2018

CEO Pension and Auditors Going Concern Opinion

Authors: Kyung Jin Park, Kyoungwon Mo, Nayoung Yoon

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Abstract

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In U.S., CEO pension is common and sizable compensation recorded as off - balance sheet liabilities before CEOs’ retirement . Also, since it becomes unplayable after bankruptcy, CEOs awarded with pension plans are known to manage their firms conservatively to prevent such bankruptcies. Therefore, it was empirically examine d how auditors consider CEO pension in determining their going - concern opinions. O ur empirical results indicate that auditors are more likely to issue nega tive going - concern opinions for firms that provide their CEOs with pension plans. The results remain robust after controlling various endogeneity issues. Overall, our findings impl y that auditors recognize CEO pensions as liabilities rather than significan tly consider how CEO pensions provide incentives for conservative firm management .

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  • JournalInternational Journal of Entrepreneurship
  • SubjectBusiness & Management
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Kyung Jin Park”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Kyoungwon Mo”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Nayoung Yoon”

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