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Research articlePublished 18 Mar 2018

Multiple-level principal-agent model under adverse selection

Authors: Pu-yan Nie

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Abstract

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Almost all principal-agent models focus on single level situation, while there exist numerous cases of principalagent relation with multiple levels in practice. This paper develops principal-agent models with multiple levels based on subcontract phenomena. The corresponding properties about principal-agent models with multiple levels under adverse selection are explored. There exists twist of the quantity in subcontract. We also find that the efficiency of principal-agent with multiple levels is lower than that with single level.

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  • JournalInternational Journal of Management and Business Studies
  • SubjectBusiness & Management
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Pu-yan Nie”

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