Scholars Central

EditorialPublished 2014

Optimal Fiscal Equalization under Asymmetric Information

Authors: Weihong Huang, Yang Chen, Weiwei Song

Journal of Global Economics

Volume 2 · Issue 1 · Pages 1–2

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Abstract

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This paper focuses on the problem of how to design optimal fiscal equalization with different fiscal needs among regions with asymmetric information. In the full information condition, our results suggest that an efficient transfer scheme should not simply fully equalize the fiscal need among regions by redistributing among regions. Instead, it should equalize the marginal cost of public funds across regions, in which the social cost of raising tax revenues can be minimized. In the asymmetric information condition, in order to eliminate the incentive of rich regions mimicking poor regions, the second best policies designed for poor regions are distorted while policies for rich regions remain the first best condition. Thus, rich regions get some informational rents.

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  • JournalJournal of Global Economics
  • SubjectBusiness & Management
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Weihong Huang”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Yang Chen”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Weiwei Song”

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