Scholars Central

Research articlePublished 2013

Research on the influence of deposit insurance system to the moral hazard of banking

Authors: Xiaobo Wang, Jingbing Feng

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Abstract

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This article establishes a panel model with Difference-in-differences Estimation and a data set of macro economy and financial data of 524 banks in China and Indonesia from 1999 to 2011. With the help of onesample test and Hausman test, the optimal model is chosen to represent the reality. The method could effectively identify cause and effect by deposit insurance system so as to provide the basis for developing more targeted strategies for risk control policies in China. Empirical research has showed that the subordinated debt ratio, bank’s franchise value, GDP Per Capita, country’s monetary policy intermediary goals and ultimate goal could have a significant impact on banks’ moral hazard in deposit and loan business under deposit insurance system, since deposit insurance systemon the whole reduce banks’ moral hazard in deposit and loan business. Size of bank has uncertain Influence of deposit insurance system on banks’ moral hazard in deposit and loan business.

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  • JournalBioTechnology: An Indian Journal
  • SubjectBiochemistry & Biotechnology
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Xiaobo Wang”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Jingbing Feng”