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Research articlePublished 27 Mar 2015

Research on incentive and constraint model of military entrust to enterprise agent reserve war general materials

Authors: He Ding-Yang, Zhang Pei-li

Journal of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research

Volume 7 · Issue 3 · Pages 102–110

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Abstract

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Military entrust to enterprise agent reserve war general materials is an important way for improving reserve benefit and reducing reserve costs. Aiming at the problem of asymmetric information in the process of enterprise agent reserve, this paper use enterprise in the pursuit of maximize their own utility while meeting the military utility maximization as the goal, use the principal-agent theory to establish a long-term and short-term incentive and constraint model of enterprise agent reserve war general materials, and analyze the model in detail, then puts forward some suggestions for establishing incentive and constraint mechanism of enterprise agent reserve war general materials.

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  • JournalJournal of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research
  • SubjectPharmaceutical Sciences
  • SubjectChemistry
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “He Ding-Yang”
  • BylineArticles whose byline prints “Zhang Pei-li”